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LOSING JERUSALEM-RFRA AND THE VOCATION OF
LEGAL CRUSADER
STEVEN

D. SMITH*

Even the mere sound of the name Jerusalem must have
had a glittering and magical splendour for the men of the
eleventh century which we are no longer capable of feeling. It
was a keyword which produced particular psychological reactions and conjured up particular eschatological notions. Men
thought, of course, of the town in Palestine where Jesus
Christ had suffered, died, been buried, and then had risen
again. But, more than this, they saw in their minds' eye the
heavenly city of Jerusalem with its gates of sapphire, its
walls and squares bright with precious stones .... It was the
centre of a spiritual world .... It was a meeting place for
those who had been scattered, the goal of the great pilgrimage of peoples, where God resides among his people; the place
at the end of time to which the elect ascend; the resting place
of the righteous; city of paradise and of the tree of life which
heals all men.'

As a first-year law student, I quickly noticed that the thirdyear students spent most of their spare conversational time talking about jobs. The late 1970s were relatively prosperous times
for legal employment, and most graduates of Yale Law School
had the luxury of choosing among an assortment of employers in
a variety of places. The recruitment efforts of these employers
were calculated, naturally, to make the soon-to-be lawyers feel
like honored dignitaries (although of course, their status would
change radically immediately upon commencing permanent, as

* Byron R. white Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I thank Curt
Bradley, Rebecca French, Bob Nagel, and Pierre Schlag for helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
1. HANS EBERHARD MAYER, THE CRUSADES 11 (John Gillingham trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1988) (1965) (citations omitted).
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opposed to summer, employment). So the third-years whiled
away many pleasant or sometimes anxious hours reflecting on
whether to confer their valuable services on Sullivan & Cromwell in New York, or Gibson, Dunn in L.A., or perhaps an appeals court judge in Dallas.
Not everyone was content with this mundane prosperity,
though. I recall overhearing a conversation between two thirdyears who were having lunch at a nearby table. One-I didn't
know him, but we can call him Miniver-was complaining that
he had not been born a generation earlier. "I decided to go into
law because I wanted to fight injustice," Miniver said. (Of course
I can't remember his precise words, especially after two decades,
but as Dave Barry says, I am not making this up). "Back in the
'60s there were jobs where you could do that. But there just isn't
much injustice left to fight."
Miniver's comment was foolish on more than one level, no
doubt, but I think it was also natural, understandable, laudable
in a way, maybe even inadvertently profound. Natural, in that
Miniver's comment reflected a common desire, as the judge I later
clerked for liked to put it, to "do well while doing good." Understandable, given the contrast between the generally unromantic
ethos of the 1970s-quite a letdown from the revolutionary
'60s-and the more idealistic spirit that still prevailed within the
law school. (The contrast was most clearly manifest, I think, in
the fact that Professor Owen Fiss and a few of his proteges managed to devote literally weeks of the class in Injunctions to what I
could only understand as a sort of reverential collective meditation on the meaning of the events from days of yore memorialized
in the casebook under the heading of Walker v. City of Birmingham.2 ) Laudable, in that the comment revealed an aspiration for a
life devoted to something beyond mere survival and self-gratification: As Geoffrey Hazard, another of my first-year professors,
told us (only in part ironically, I think): 'ou all have a conscience. That's why you're here, and not in business school." And
profound, because... but this is not the place to investigate
whether evil is a necessary condition for the existence of good, so
that the eradication of evil would actually be a grave misfortune.

2. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).

1998]

LOSING JERUSALEM

909

In any event, Hazard was right: Most of us did have a conscience (if that is the right word for what we had), and we hoped
to use law to improve the world. And not all of us were as despondently sanguine about the world's achieved goodness as
Miniver. The causes that might attract our reforming zeal differed, of course. For some, the cause might be civil rights or gender equality; for others it was ending the death penalty, which
our constitutional law professor Charles Black thunderously denounced with a crusading eloquence worthy of Peter the Hermit.' Environmentalism, though not as popular at Yale as it is
at Colorado where I work now, was a possible commitment. Discussions of animal rights were beginning, though they still had
an air of novelty. And for a few of us, something we might generically and amorphously call "religion" was the cause of choice
(although our commitment was pretty much invisible, because
the law curriculum at Yale paid no attention whatsoever to this
particular concern).
For many graduates, of course, the zeal for justice would soon
be snuffed out by the mercenary rigors of the corporate law firm.
But not everyone gave up the faith. And I suspect that the reforming impulse survived in greater purity in those who chose to
leave behind the lucrative rewards of law practice for the-let us
be honest, still far from ascetic-life of teaching and scholarship.
Indeed, without appreciating this common motivation, I think,
you cannot really understand the work that over the last generation or so has been offered under the description of "legal scholarship," either in general or with specific reference to the religion clauses. A good deal of that scholarship, I believe, can only
be viewed as the work of what we might call "legal crusaders."
In particular, you cannot otherwise understand the indignant
scholarly reaction to Employment Division v. Smith,4 or the fer-

3. Peter came from Picardy and before the crusade he had probably been
active as a preacher in Central France. He did not look very attractive,
usually being caked with mud and dirt, as he rode about the countryside
on a donkey. Yet he was a man of electrifying eloquence who radiated an
unusual power.
MAYER, supra note 1, at 39.
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 186 n.68
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vor of support for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),5 or the likely reaction to City of Boerne v. Flores.6
I. LAW AS CRUSADE
The allusion to crusaders is meant to be more than a passing
flourish; I believe the analogy is more fruitful than that. The
original crusader, after all, was typically a man whose principal
talents were not of a particularly spiritual nature, and the crusade was a way of turning these dubious skills to a higher purpose. Someone who might otherwise have been little more than
a hired sword, or perhaps even a petty cutthroat, was thereby
promoted to a sort of holy warrior.
In the same way, the litigator or legal scholar is a person
trained mostly in the skills of arguing, framing issues in a tendentious way, and making verbal distinctions and deductions
within a highly abstract and artificial conceptual system. It is a
necessary kind of work, probably, perhaps even a socially valuable work; but it is not an especially ennobling one. Most of the
people engaged in this sort of work are probably dedicated to
nothing more lofty than, as a disapproving relative once put it to
me while I was still in a business litigation practice, fighting
over "who gets the money?" But in the legal crusade these argumentative or rhetorical talents are redeemed by being devoted to
advancing righteous causes.
Other parallels are less pleasant to contemplate. Although the
medieval crusader thought to elevate what otherwise would be
at best practical and at worst vicious pursuits, there was also
something incongruous in his calling. In the first place, the
gains for which the crusader traveled, bled, and killed were
mostly symbolic. Jerusalem itself was not so much a place as a
symbol.' Indeed, the situation could hardly have been otherwise,
because the crusader's means were wholly out of line with his
ostensible ends: You just cannot save souls by bashing in heads

(1995) (collecting scholarly criticisms of Smith).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994); see Lupu, supra note 4, at 187 (discussing the support for RFRA).
6. 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
7. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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with a mace, or by plundering the capital of a rival Christian
tradition, or by making Jerusalem flow with the infidels' blood.'
And symbolic victories may well have been accompanied by real
losses: The exhilaration of the crusade may have caused people
to overlook the grotesque incommensurability between means
and ends, and hence to neglect the sorts of more quiet, patient
efforts that could produce real spiritual gains.
So if there was something daunting or inspiring in the image
of the knight on horseback and in polished armor with the sign
of the cross emblazoned on his shield, there is also, from our
perspective at least, something absurd and even contemptible in
the spectacle. How in heaven's name, we may wonder in retrospect, could so many people have been so deluded? How could
they have believed that they were actually serving God? Why
couldn't they understand that if they were really determined to
follow Christ, the way to do so was to devote themselves to understanding his teachings and cultivating the virtues he
taught-such as turning the other cheek 9 or loving one's enemies,"0 not killing them?

Less dramatic but still similar questions might be raised about
the legal crusader, especially the crusader who fights for justice in
the guise of legal scholar. Realistically, the legal scholar, like the
medieval holy warrior, must be viewed as someone who fights
mostly for symbolic victories. That is because the causal connection between scholarly articles and real world conditions is interrupted by two large gaps, which taken together make the
scholar's means-writing law review articles, principally-an
especially problematic way of achieving her ostensible ends."

8. The intoxication of victory, religious fanaticism, and the memory of hardships bottled up for three years exploded in a horrifying bloodbath in
which the crusaders hacked down everyone, irrespective of race or religion, who was unfortunate enough to come within reach of their swords.
They waded, ankle-deep in blood, through streets covered with bodies.
MAYER, supra note 1, at 56.
9. See Matthew 5:39.
10. See Matthew 5:44.
11. Pierre Schlag has developed extensively the observations that follow. See, e.g.,
Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, in PAUL F. CAMPOS ET AL.,
AGAINST THE LAW 29 (1996) [hereinafter Schlag, Normativity]; Pierre Schlag, Writing
for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419 (1992) [hereinafter Schlag, Writing].
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One gap separates the scholar and her writings from the
judge. Considerable evidence suggests, I think, that judges rarely read legal scholarship, or that they are not much influenced
by it even if they do occasionally read it. 2 To be sure, prescriptive scholarship may have more gradual and indirect effects-for
example, by educating or conditioning the next generation of
lawyers, judges, and professors. But there is little reason to
suppose that these more indirect effects will correspond closely
to the scholar's specific recommendations. A generation's worth
of justifications for judicial activism developed by admirers of
the Warren Court might take effect just in time for a more conservative judiciary to put down "progressive" measures, such as
affirmative action.'" Realistically, it seems, prescriptive legal
scholarship more often serves to rationalize what was done in
the past than to direct what will be done in the future. 4
The second gap divides what the judge says or commands
from what actually happens in the world. There is reason to
believe that the cause-effect relationship here is at best very
complicated: The judge's injunction sallies forth into the world
and promptly mixes with a whole company of other unfathomable factors and characters to produce an end result that may be
utterly different than anything the judge, or anyone else, would
have contemplated. 5
It doesn't follow, I think, that law professors should simply
abandon normative scholarship. And indeed, at some level all
legal scholarship is probably normative in some sense. 16 Still,

given the complications and dilutions and unanticipated
redirections noticed above, the legal scholar who spends his days
piously issuing prescriptions to the world may begin to seem a
bit silly. His rectitude is largely spent, a cynic might conclude,
12. See Schlag, Writing, supra note 11, at 421-22.
13. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2580, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).

14. See STEVEN D. SMrrH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON ch. 7
(1998).
15. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (relying on empirical data to question under what
conditions courts can produce political and social change).
16. See generally Schlag, Normativity, supra note 11, at 33 (discussing the pervasiveness of normativity in legal thought).
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in a sort of self-righteous posturing-in ostentatiously holding
the right opinions on a variety of fashionable issues. What exactly does he think he is accomplishing, we might well ask. Why
would intelligent people have supposed that we could truly reform society by passing laws, or by issuing injunctions com-

manding the world to be virtuous and just, 7 much less by publishing articles to that effect in little-read law reviews? Does the
legal scholar really care about social improvement at all, or only
about his own status and reputation? And if he does care, why

doesn't he devote himself to doing something that might actually
help-getting more directly involved in politics or general public
education, perhaps, or even cultivating his own soul or attending

to his family so that in Confucian fashion the world might actually, gradually, be made better? 8

To be sure, Confucius also emphasized the value of scholarly
learning. 9 But that observation points to another problem with
the legal crusader: Her vocation mixes the roles of scholar and

17. Gerald Rosenberg has observed that:
A further danger of litigation as a strategy for significant'social reform is
that symbolic victories may be mistaken for substantive ones, covering a'
reality that is distasteful. Rather than working to change that reality,
reformers relying on a litigation strategy may be misled (or content?) to
celebrate the illusion of change.
ROSENBERG, supra note 15, at 340.
18. The Confucian classic The Great Learning explains:
The ancients who wished clearly to exemplify illustrious virtue
throughout the world would first set up good government in their states.
Wishing to govern well their states, they would first regulate their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they would first cultivate their
persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they would first rectify their
minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they would first seek sincerity in
their thoughts. Wishing for sincerity in their thoughts, they would first
extend their knowledge.
The Great Learning (n.d.), reprinted in SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 127, 129
(Win. Theodore de Bary et al. ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1960). The Analects further
provide:
Confucius said: "Lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties, and the people will try to keep out of jail, but will have no sense
of shame. Lead the people by virtue and restrain them by the rules of
decorum, and the people will have a sense of shame, and moreover will
become good."
SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION, supra, at 34 (quoting Analects 11:3 (n.d.)).
19. See LI FU CHEN, THE CONFUCIAN WAY 19-21 (Shih Shun Liu trans., 1986).
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advocate in a way that can easily end up doing violence to
both.0 Typically she will not feel free simply to pursue truth
wherever the search may lead. Her "truths" must be ones that
speak to current controversies as currently formulated-otherwise she will not be participating in the legal conversation-and they will need to end up favoring the righteous side
of those controversies. Uncooperative truths will be of little
value, or even of negative value.
Moreover, as other professors and lawyers come to understand
the tilted and tendentious nature of legal scholarship, that scholarship loses its authority as "scholarship"-and, hence, its ability to persuade. 2 ' The reforming law professor busily turning out
advocacy scholarship may come to resemble the obsessive, selfappointed soap box orator: At first people may be slightly interested, but interest turns to amusement, and then to annoyance,
until gradually people learn to pay no attention.

II.

THE CRUSADING VOCATION AND THE SCHOLARSHIP OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

These doubts apply in force, I think, to those of us who may
have thought to advance righteousness by using legal scholar-

20. See generally Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REv. 817
(1993) (arguing that most modern constitutional scholarship is really advocacy in the
guise of scholarship-an approach that has little value because scholarship's goal is
to seek truth). Learned Hand echoed similar sentiments over 50 years ago:
You may take Martin Luther or Erasmus for your model, but you
cannot play both roles at once; you may not carry a sword beneath a
scholar's gown, or lead flaming causes from a cloister. Luther cannot be
domesticated in a university. You cannot raise the standard against oppression, or leap into the breach to relieve injustice, and still keep an
open mind to every disconcerting fact, or an open ear to the cold voice of
doubt. I am satisfied that a scholar who tries to combine these parts
sells his birthright for a mess of pottage; that, when the final count is
made, it will be found that the impairment of his powers far outweighs
any possible contribution to the causes he has espoused. If he is fit to
serve in his calling at all, it is only because he has learned not to serve
in any other, for his singleness of mind quickly evaporates in the fires of
passion, however holy.
LEARNED HAND, On Receiving an Honorary Degree, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 134,
138 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3rd ed. 1974).
21. See SMITH, supra note 14, at ch. 6.
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ship to advocate various positions or principles for protecting
"religious freedom." To begin with, there is reason to doubt, here
as elsewhere, that the vast bulk of scholarly writing is ever read
by judges, or that judges are persuaded to change their minds by
the rare scholarly article that they do occasionally read.' Although lores might seem to provide contrary evidence, I think
it in fact supports this observation. The case produced opinions
by Justices Scalia and O'Connor arguing about the "original
meaning" of the Free Exercise Clause, 23 and the opinions dealt
at length with an article on the subject by Michael
McConnell.' Perhaps never in this field has a law review article received as much explicit, official attention in a Supreme
Court decision. So if there was ever a chance for a legal scholar
to influence the Court directly in shaping a key religion clause
doctrine, one might guess, it was in this case. Professor
McConnell was probably flattered-at least, I would have
been-but it also needs to be noted that neither Scalia nor
O'Connor budged at all from the positions they had held on the
Free Exercise Clause before the article was published.2 5
Even more importantly, there is at best a complicated, unpredictable, sometimes perverse correlation between what the judges command and what happens to religion, or religious freedom,
in the world. Most of the interactions between religion and politics still have not been brought within the courts' conscious cognizance. 2' And when the courts do address an issue, their commands are subject to construal and misconstrual,
underenforcement and overapplication. Hence we hear of school
districts where scripture reading and class prayers persist,27 but
also of school administrators who forbid students to bow their

22. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
23. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172-76 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part); id. at 2176-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990).
25. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-90 (1990); id. at 891-907
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

26. See Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81
MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).

27. See, e.g., Jay Reeves, Schools Targeted Jewish Family, Suit Says Religion, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, at A4, available in 1997 WL 13979789.
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heads in a silent grace over lunch." We observe the courts ordering the removal of public religious symbols in order to reduce
alienation,2 9 but for all we know the net result may be an overall
increase in aggregate alienation, and in subtle but powerful religious hostility. 31 We note that decisions calculated to make public life more secular are followed by-quite likely as a natural
but unanticipated reaction-the rise of a more aggressive "religious right."3 ' The Supreme Court holds that the very possibility of religious indoctrination precludes public school teachers
from offering remedial math and reading classes in parochial
schools.32 The consequence is that students march through rain
and snow to receive the classes in vans across the street or down
the block; millions of dollars and lost school hours later, the
Court concedes that it made a mistake.3 3
But the problem with using religion law scholarship primarily
as advocacy is not just that such advocacy is inefficacious, or unevenly and sometimes perversely efficacious. The advocacy orientation also undermines the value of such scholarship as scholarship. For example, legal scholars have done a good deal of historical work, some of it quite impressive. But insofar as they are
engaged in a crusade of one kind or another, they must use history tactically to provide answers to our questions. So if it turns
out, as not surprisingly it often does, that historical actors were
not addressing our questions at all-that they were addressing
their own questions, which were quite different-the legal scholar is likely to find this situation unacceptable. Like a lawyer
cross-examining a witness, the legal scholar will insist that his
historical predecessors answer the questions put to them; and
being long since dead, how can they protest? Not surprisingly,

28. See, e.g., Joan Little, City Schools Issue Rules About Students, Religion, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 11, 1996, at 2B, available in 1996 WL 2779268.
29. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-602 (1989); id. at
626-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Smith v.
Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Smith v. County of
Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990).
30. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAmURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 109-15 (1995).

31. See id. at 115-17.
32. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
33. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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the resulting "history" will be distorted and unreal. 4 So it is
that the "history" relied upon by religion law scholars, as well as
by Supreme Court justices, is so often a sort of stylized mythology, loosely grounded in the past but remade for modern uses.
In these respects, one might say, religion law scholars have
merely succumbed to the temptations that afflict legal scholars
generally. But it seems to me (and I say this with a twinge of
embarrassment) that professors whose commitment is to "religion" ought to have been more perceptive, and hence more immune to the common mistakes, than other law professors. Religious believers have been alerted, after all, to the danger of supposing that one can be virtuous by making public professions or
gestures on behalf of righteous causes. 5 In addition, religious
believers are heirs to a long tradition that should have educated
them in the difficulties and complications of using "law" as an
instrument for protecting and advancing the cause of God.
More specifically, believers are the beneficiaries of ample historical examples of the potentially corrupting effects for religion
of striking up a cozy partnership with earthly government. (And
the judiciary is after all merely one branch of the government,
even though law professors often display an uncanny ability to
forget the fact). 6 Believers also ought to know that religion does
not need to curry the favor of earthly government-that "[aill
nations before [God] are as nothing"" and that God "bringeth
the princes to nothing; he maketh the judges of the earth as
vanity." 8 To be sure, religious believers have often been the

34. For an elaboration of this point, see SMITH, supra note 14, at chs. 1-4.
35. In the New Testament, this sort of behavior was condemned as hypocrisy. See,
e.g., Matthew 6:1-5.
36. H. Jefferson Powell observed: "Contemporary American judges do not impose
the rule of reason on Caesar, they are Caesar." H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL
TRADITrON OF AMERICAN CONSTrrUTONALISM 11 (1993).
37. Isaiah 40:17.
38. Id. 40:23. The fact that religions sometimes change or give way before governmental pressure, as with the Mormon abandonment of polygamy, is not incompatible with this belief. Indeed, if the believer truly holds that God lives, that He governs all things, and that He "works in mysterious ways," then it becomes difficult to
say peremptorily that changes brought about through outside pressure are necessarily contrary to God's will. In fact, scripture plainly indicates that God sometimes uses even those in rebellion against Him to bring about His purposes. See, e.g., Genesis 45:4-8 (relating how God worked through Joseph's brothers, who sold him into
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victims of official persecution; but their faith tells them that
they will be blessed for this and will be rewarded with the kingdom of heaven. 9 So it is at least curious to observe the zeal with
which law professors, among others, construct legal barriers calculated to ensure that the faithful will not experience this sort of
blessedness.
I don't want to be understood as suggesting that religious believers ought to cultivate persecution, or that they should be
oblivious to legal aspects of religious freedom. In fact, I don't
mean to draw any specific conclusions here about the proper
relationship between religion and government. That relationship
is extremely complicated, and perhaps ultimately unfathomable.
"In the world but not of the world" has always been, for the religious, a necessary but also confounding concept.4" Indeed, that is
the whole point of these observations: Religious believers even
more than others ought to be able to appreciate that the connections between "law" and various goods, especially those associated with "religion," are highly problematic. That appreciation
ought to alert them to the complexities, and the perils, of legal
crusading on behalf of religion. And it ought to prepare them to
resist the passing satisfactions of symbolic victories-and the
thin disappointments of symbolic defeats.
III. THE FALL OF RFRA AND THE LEGAL CRUSADER

All of this is prelude to a comment on City of Boerne v.
Flores.4 What is the meaning of Flores? What are its implications? My guess is that the decision will provoke stern denunciations from the spectrum of groups that supported the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act; there will be talk of all the damage that
the decision will inflict on religion.42 But my answer is that I don't
know what effects the decision will have on religion, or whether
Egypt, to save the family of Israel); Isaiah 10:5-15 (relating how God used Assyrians
to reprove Israel); 2 Chronicles 36:22 (stating that God "stirred up the spirit of
Cyrus king of Persia" to allow the Jews to return to their homeland).
39. See Matthew 5:10-11; 2 Maccabees 7:7-14, 7:20-41, 12:42-45.
40. This phrase emanates from John 17:14-16.
41. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
42. This denunciation has started already. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Laws Are
Urged to Protect Religion, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A15.
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the decision is ultimately good or bad for religion, and I don't
think any other human knows either. "The information's unavailable," as someone said, "to the mortal man."43
Purely as a symbolic matter, the decision probably represents
a defeat for "religious freedom." Even that observation must be
qualified: Flores's focus on limitations on congressional power"
makes its symbolic significance for religious freedom even more
ambiguous than was the case with Employment Division v.
Smith.45 Still, Flores in effect reaffirms Smith," and as we know,
Smith provoked an outpouring of condemnation (from, among
others, myself)47 claiming that the Court had betrayed religion or
religious freedom.4"
In retrospect, it seems that the Sherbert v. Verner49 "compelling
state interest" doctrine 0 was for many religious believers a prize
to be fought for and defended. So Smith represented, in effect, the
loss of Jerusalem, to be retaken (temporarily as it turned out) by
the enactment of RFRA. And because nearly everyone also agreed
that the compelling interest test overruled in Smith--or, rather,
declared never to have existed 5 1 -had carried little force in actual
practice,52 the outcry seemingly reflected a perception that religion
had lost its symbolic place of preference in the constitutional
scheme. Floreshelps to confirm this perception.

43. I believe one can say with confidence that the claim that Flores is the "most
church-state decision . . . in fifty years," see Jed Rubenfeld,
important

Antidisestablishmentarianism:Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 2347, 2347 (1997), is, shall we say, exaggerated. That claim is best understood
as an effort to enhance the significance of law review articles discussing the decision.
44. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162-72.
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws may be
applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
interest).
46. Cf. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160 (explaining that "Congress enacted RFRA in
direct response to" Smith); id. at 2172 (declaring RFRA unconstitutional).

47. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231-37 (1991).
48. See id.; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. See id. at 403.
51. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990).
52. See Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect,
65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 519, 529 (1994).
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But what effect will this symbolic defeat have on the actual
exercise of religion in the country? This, I think, is what no one
knows. At least in the short-run, a few religious claimants who
might have been relieved of legal burdens likely will have to
bear them, for better or worse. Beyond this, I think, it is hard to
predict. The difficulty in part reflects the usual empirical problems that afflict prophecy. It may be, for example, that Congress
or the states will enact new general laws like RFRA but designed to avoid the limitations discussed in Flores.53 Or they
might enact a variety of more specific exemptions for religion. If
they do, then Mores may have almost no practical effect at all.
Suppose such legislation is not enacted. In that case, our assessment of the value and implications of Floresis still impeded by
a variety of limitations in our understanding. I will mention three.
First, we do not have any good theory of religious freedom
against which to measure even known consequences of this or
related decisions. Let me explain the difficulty in this way: Even
if "religious freedom" were a sort of quantifiable commodity subject to linear measurement-which it surely is not-almost no
one believes simply that "more is better." No one thinks, that is,
that any citizen's claim to anything should be granted so long as
it is sincerely based in religion, so that denying the claim would
burden that citizen's religious exercise or fulfillment. If Cheevy
sincerely reports that he believes God has appointed him to be
President, no legal scholar is going to argue that Cheevy has a
constitutional right to the office. So the real questions are always about how much and what kind of freedom to practice religion ought to be maintained. And we have no convincing theory
or measure for answering those questions. Consequently, even if
Mores will in some sense reduce religious freedom, that alone
does not show the decision to be either good or bad.'

53. See David 0. Stewart, Power Surge: Asserting Authority over Congress in Religious Freedom Case, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1997, at 46, 47 ("The next move belongs to
Congress. Supporters of [RFRAI vowed to craft a narrower version for passage.").
54. On the possibility of developing a satisfactory theory of religious freedom,
compare Steven D. Smith, Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?, 15
CONsT. COMMENTARY (forthcoming 1998) (arguing that such a theory is impossible in
principle), with Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693, 703-47 (1997) (defending the possibility of an adequate theory).
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Second, we do not have any good understanding of the relation between "law" and "religion," or between different kinds of
laws or legal regimes and different kinds of religions sociologically understood. Sometimes official persecution or, what is more
likely in this country today, insensitivity may inhibit or weaken
some religions. At other times these policies seem to stimulate
or strengthen religion. "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of
the church."55
Finally, we do not have any good understanding of what for
the religious believer ought to be the most important issue-that
is, the relation between "law" and "religion" religiously understood. For example, it is often said that the scheme of religious
voluntarism adopted in this country in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, though depriving the churches of
governmental support, actually had the effect of strengthening
religion.5" Though causal connections are difficult to draw with
confidence, relatively high levels of religiosity in this country
compared with those in some European countries that maintained established churches for a longer time seem consistent
with this view.57 But religious voluntarism also led to dramatic
changes in the nature of religious worship and practice. The rise
of revivalism as a way of enlisting popular participation and the
decline in the intellectual requirements for the ministry were
among the natural products of religious voluntarism."5
55. See, e.g., EARL E. CAIRNS, CHRISTIANITY THROUGH THE CENTURIES 95, 101 (rev.

ed. 1967) ("The [early Christian] Church continued to develop in spite of or, perhaps,
. The rapid spread of Christianity [in the first
partly because of persecution ...
century], even during the periods of heaviest persecution, proved that indeed the
blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church.").
56. Alexis de Tocqueville was an early proponent of this view. See 1 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 308-12 (Francis Bowen trans., Phillips Bradley
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1956) (1835).
57. See Everett Carll Ladd, Secular and Religious America, in UNSECULAR AMERICA 14, 15-20 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1986).
58. See generally NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRIS-

TIANITY (1989) (explaining how the democratization of Christianity in this country
undermined Calvinist orthodoxy, and theology in general, and led to a greater emphasis on emotion and individual autonomy); SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 123 (1963) (arguing that the sepa-

ration of church and state stimulated revivalism; in turn, revivalism "tends to produce an oversimplification of all problems" and also "tends to lean theologically in
an Armenian or even Pelagian direction with the implicit suggestion that man saves
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Let us grant that these developments led to a broader participation of the population in religious activities: Is it clear that
"religion" was thereby strengthened? Proponents of more
pietistic or evangelistic or pentecostal versions of religion might
say "yes"; indeed, they might contend that these changes in the
character of religion were desirable in themselves, even apart
from their function in making religion more accessible to some
parts of the population. But of course, more traditional religionists like Timothy Dwight or Lyman Beecher,59 as well as European visitors like Frances Trollope,60 took a very different view.
And although Beecher's and Trollope's general attitudes toward
democratic developments may seem intolerably stuffy, still,
watching some of the religious programs on television or listening to contemporary religious popular music, one can perhaps
sympathize with their perspective.
Or, to return to the case at hand, suppose that a decision like
Flores leads to a higher incidence of official religious intolerance,
himself through choice").
59. See HATCH, supra note 58, at 18-19. Beecher spoke out against the newly
dominant, untrained clergy:
There may be, perhaps, 1500 besides who are nominally ministers of the
Gospel. But they are generally illiterate men, often not possessed of a
good English education, and in some instances unable to read or write.
By them, as a body, learning is despised. With few exceptions they are
utterly unacquainted with theology and like other men are devoted
through the week to secular employment, and preach on the Sabbath,
with such preparation as such an education and such avocations allow.
Id. at 18 (quoting Lyman Beecher, An Address to the Charitable Society for the
Education of Indigent Pious Young Men for the Ministry of the Gospel (1814)).
Hatch quotes a popular preacher, who expressed the opposing view:
What I insist, upon my brethren and sisters, is this: larnin isn't religion,
and eddication don't give a man the power of the Spirit ....
And so, when
[the Lord] wants to blow down the walls of the spiritual Jericho, my beloved brethren and sisters, he don't take one of your smooth, polite, college
larnt gentlemen, but a plain, natural ram's-horn sort of man like me.
Id. at 20 (quoting 1 SAMUEL GOODRICH, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFETIME 196-97
(1856)).
60. See MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 221 (1992) (quoting Trollope as describing the revival meeting as a "most
terrific saturnalia"). More generally, Trollope reported that in the United States
"ftlhe whole people appear to be divided into an almost endless variety of religious
factions," and "[tihe vehement expressions of insane or hypocritical zeal, such as
were exhibited during 'the Revival,' can but ill atone for the want of village worship." Id. at 221.
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and that one result of this change is that the more noncommittal
members of some religions are induced to abandon their lukewarm faith while other adherents develop a more intense commitment. Numerically, the religion may appear weaker than
before. But from a religious standpoint the change might represent a definite gain.6 To be sure, the believer cannot accommodate herself to the world as easily or as comfortably as before. But
then, didn't her faith warn her all along that accommodating
2
herself to the world was a temptation to be fervently resisted?
IV.

CONCLUSION: CALLING OFF THE CRUSADE

The preceding discussion suggests that for a variety of reasons
we do not-and we probably never will-know what the impact
of Flores will be, either on "religious freedom" or on religion. So
we should be, if not approving, at least temperate in our criticisms of Flores: The "compelling state interest" test was not
Jerusalem, and in any case Jerusalem will not be won by litigation, much less by writing law review articles.
Of course, most of the points made here could be generalized
to other religion clause decisions, and to other legal decisions in
general. So legal crusaders of all types will often be charging
and thrashing about in the dark. Is this conclusion discouraging
for the legal scholar-perhaps even nihilistic? I don't think so. In
other disciplines it is not taken for granted that the point of
scholarship is to prescribe decisions to some authoritative body
or institution. Why must legal scholarship be bound by that
assumption?
To put the point more positively: Recognizing the futility of
crusading should free legal scholars to be more curious, and
more honest. We can investigate questions that have no obvious
"advocacy" payoff. We can stop forcing historical figures to answer our questions: It might turn out that they (even those
whose positions we have been brought up to deplore) actually

61. Cf. Revelation 3:15-16 ("I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot:
I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold
nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth.").
62. See James 4:4 ("[Kjnow ye not that the friendship of the world is enmity with
God? Whosoever therefore will be a friend of the world is the enemy of God.").
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have something to teach us, instead of just providing authority
for views we already hold. Or, insofar as our scholarship continues to be normative in character, it might be normative in a less
tendentious, less specifically result-oriented, and hence perhaps
ultimately more helpful way.
More generally, we can draw the conclusions that seem to be
indicated without constantly worrying about whether we are
coming down on the side of justice and virtue. Just as the eventual recognition that Jerusalem was not to be won for Christ by
the sword freed erstwhile crusaders to pursue a life more truly
Christian, so also the realization that legal scholarship is not
well suited to reforming the world in any direct and immediate
way might liberate the religious believer/law professor to practice both a more uncompromised faith and a more uncorrupted
scholarship.

